Summary
Lorde starts this essay, which concludes the collection, by explaining that she visited Grenada for the first time in the late 1970s, because it was her mother's native country and she was looking for a metaphorical home. She describes in bullet points some of the loveliness she encountered there: schoolchildren in uniform walking down the beach, a woman serving fried fish and tea in the market. This visit occurred in 1979, shortly before the coup that would shift power from an American-sanctioned government to the People's Revolutionary Government, or PRG. Lorde describes a gorgeous and abundant but unnavigable place, since, she notes, the country's infrastructure was significantly improved under the PRG, after her visit. Grenada produces spices and expensive, high-quality cocoa, although Grenadians, says Lorde, have to pay steep prices for imported processed foods.
However, Lorde says, her second visit in the 1980s felt mournful and frightening, taking place after the United States invasion of Grenada. She identifies several narratives spread by the American government concerning the invasion—such as that Grenada was in the process of building a military airport and stockpiling weapons—and debunks them. She quotes the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who referred to this invasion as a "sneak attack on a pathetic island of 110,000 people with no army..." Now, on her second visit to Grenada, Lorde sees women with missing teeth working to repair roads and recalls that the PRG provided dental care to many who could not have previously afforded it. At the time of her first visit, a huge amount of good farmland lay unused by wealthy landlords. Under the PRG, Lorde notes, it was used to produce again and the economy improved, and now, after the invasion, the economy has again worsened. Moreover, for years the United States blocked aid to Grenada; only now, after taking power, do they offer welfare there. Lorde suggests that the United States did not wish to set a precedent for a self-determined, thriving nation run by people of color. In fact, racism and the dehumanizing of African Americans has paved the way for white Americans to accept the invasion of a Caribbean nation. Moreover, in the wake of defeat in the Vietnam War and with a failing economy, the American government needed an easy win in order to boost their image at home. And, Lorde questions, if America's government truly acts in the interests of democracy abroad, why do they support repressive governments in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and South Africa, but dismantle a thriving democracy in Grenada? Lorde posits that the Grenadian invasion, and the subsequent jump in unemployment numbers, was engineered to create a cheap labor force for the benefit of American interests. This is part of a larger pattern of American invasion and colonialism, justified by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. The United States was likely planning the invasion for a long while, Lorde says, citing as evidence the military's engagement in a war game with uncanny similarities to the actual invasion. Further evidence suggests that the U.S. government was at least aware of, and likely responsible for, the assassination of the PRG's prime minister Maurice Bishop. Lorde accuses the psychological operations unit of the CIA of purposely making Grenadian politician Bernard Coard and General Hudson Austin in order to lower morale and willingness to resist. Furthermore, Lorde is suspicious of the media treatment of two Americans working for the Grenadian government just prior to the invasion, suggesting that they were secretly working for the American government.
The U.S. government treated its invasion of Grenada as a test, among other things, of whether African American soldiers would be willing to harm or kill other Black people—an increasingly important question given America's new military involvements in the global south. The answer, she says, is yes. She jokes that the military also tested out the utility and popularity of new "Nazi-style helmets" and uniforms. She then quotes some of the language used by "psychological warfare experts operating in Grenada," the purpose of which, she argues, is to whip up white Americans' fear and scorn of a nearby sovereign Black population: the quotes include the claim that intervention was "not an invasion, [but] a rescue mission," and that Grenada's militia were "armed thugs." Even Black Americans are persuaded by the government's scaremongering about socialism, manipulated by language that Lorde compares to the "doublespeak" in George Orwell's novel 1984. In addition, Lorde wonders whether the invasion was also intended as a threat to African Americans, reminding them of the government's power and willingness to subdue them. She quotes a Grenadian woman who lost her father after American soldiers entered their home, claiming that Cubans were housed inside. A high civilian body count has been obscured by the sheer difficulty of identifying and recovering the many bodies. Press censorship, meanwhile, allowed America to present the invasion as a far smoother and less bloody affair than it truly was, and to avoid accountability for destruction of life and property.
Next, Lorde backtracks and explains what Grenada's socialist revolution accomplished, and therefore what the American invasion destroyed. The revolution allowed Grenadians to purchase food grown on their own fertile island rather than expensive processed imports. It doubled the number of doctors in the country and staved off infectious disease. It increased educational opportunities and literacy for people of all ages. The people who defended Grenada against the U.S. military were not Cuban militants, as the government insisted—they were Grenadians defending their quality of life and their growing national unity across lines of race and class, which posed a threat to American interests. Meanwhile, Grenadians are traumatized and baffled, manipulated by American propaganda but not reassured by America's claims that the invasion was intended as a rescue mission. Finally, Lorde returns to her own position. She confesses to being a "relative" to Grenadians rather than a daughter of the country herself, but explains that she visited in order to listen to those who lived there. And Grenada, says Lorde, will survive, just as it has survived colonial oppression in the past.
Analysis
Lorde's method for convincing readers that the American invasion of Grenada was both immoral and unnecessary is two-pronged. One of her tasks is to demonstrate the harm that has been done to the people of Grenada, as well as the country's economy and landscape. In service of this goal, Lorde relies on emotional appeals, often quoting from those whose lives have been turned upside down by this invasion. She paints horrific pictures of mass graves and bloodthirsty shooting sprees to show just how devastating this invasion was. She hints at the shock of the civilians affected by quoting a girl who believes that "the Russians had put tablets into (the Americans') milk that would make them shoot anybody on sight," as if unable to process that people would willingly take part in such unjustified brutality. The other prong of Lorde's argument is more coolly, logically laid out, though in this cool logic lies an even more potent righteous anger. This essay attempts to make the case that America invaded Grenada for completely strategic reasons, and that this strategy was purely based on a desire to crush any example of a thriving Black democracy in the Americas. To make this case, Lorde crams her essay with a heady mixture of evidence both contemporary and historical, ultimately attributing the American government's actions to the policies laid out in the Monroe Doctrine.
The Monroe Doctrine, a set of ideas first articulated by President James Monroe in 1823, argues that the United States is entitled to a degree of control over both North and South America. In the context of the eighteenth century, these ideas were intended to prevent European countries from interfering in the affairs of the relatively-new United States and other newly founded countries in the Western hemisphere—most of which were controlled by white descendants of Europeans. In this instance, though, Lorde writes, the doctrine has been adapted for a new reality, in which an English-speaking nation in short distance of the United States is controlled by, and run for the benefit of, Black citizens. In this case, the idea that the United States can and should exert control over the entire Western hemisphere is employed to crush that pocket of Black socialism.
Finally, in this essay, Lorde subtly overturns certain gendered ideas in order to mock the Reagan administration's desire to appear tough and masculine. In a funny moment within a sober account, she pokes fun at the uniforms of the U.S. army, associating them with the stereotypically feminine sins of vanity, impracticality, and superficiality. She also emphasizes the American military's reliance on "Psy-Ops," or psychological operations, and argues that the Grenadian invasion was engineered to make America look strong by letting them crush an unprepared ally. While military might is generally associated with masculinity and strength, Lorde reveals this show of masculinity as a farce, oriented around making the American military appear strong. This, again, redraws the lines of associations between gendered activities, and groups the traditionally masculine military with the stereotyped feminine flaws of vanity and manipulativeness. In this way, Lorde cuts away at the mythology surrounding the American military, making them appear at once harmful and silly.
