The 2010 earthquake in Haiti was one of the most devastating natural disasters of the Western Hemisphere in modern history. Between 250,000-300,000 people lost their lives and 1.5 million were displaced into squalid tent camps. In the wake of the earthquake, billions of dollars were raised globally, with some estimates as high as $13 billion. And yet, years after, very little progress has been made in the lives and infrastructure of the country.
Looking at the Red Cross provides a case study for understanding the failures and challenges surrounding international aid in Haiti. The Red Cross raised half a billion dollars on behalf of Haitians. However, they kept raising money long after they had enough to fund the type of projects they were experienced in providing relief in. As such, they started getting involved in development projects without any expertise. To remedy this, they contracted other NGOs to execute many of their projects. Yet each organization they outsourced to would take money for their own overhead. So for every dollar raised for Haitians, as much as 40% was going to the organizations running and administering the projects rather than Haitians themselves. Furthermore, the Red Cross relied heavily on foreigners with no experience in Haiti who did not even speak French or Creole. Internal emails have revealed disparaging comments from some of these employees about their Haitian coworkers. The combination of factors led to high turnover and projects that never advanced.
The host of factors above made the Red Cross ineffective, out of touch, and outright harmful. They are a clear example of what Anne refers to in the book as “disaster vultures,” using Haitian suffering for their own benefit. In Campeche, a neighborhood in Port-Au-Prince, the Red Cross promised to rebuild 130,000 homes; by 2015 only six had been built. These broken promises created ill will and a lack of trust with the community.
Across Haiti, reports have found a patchwork of progress. Two and a half years after the earthquake, there were still hundreds of thousands of people living in abysmal conditions in the tent cities. In an effort to clear the camps, money was spent on temporary housing shelters and rental subsidies. But for the hundreds of millions spent on these efforts, neither of them address permanent housing solutions in the country. Without long term solutions, tens of thousands of people have moved back into structurally unsound homes.
Only a fraction of the permanent homes promised by international aid organizations have been built. There were definitely challenges for all aid groups in Haiti; for example, difficulties obtaining land titles stalled many rebuilding efforts. However, conditions in Haiti alone are not enough to explain the startling lack of progress. The United States government pledged 2.7 billion dollars to the rebuilding efforts in Haiti and promised to build 15,000 houses. Over the years, they have reduced that number by 80% and have only built 2,649. Across the board, investigations reveal that many of the homes that have been built are of low quality and yet cost an exorbitant amount. The organizations that have been most successful are those that directly collaborate with Haitians in the rebuilding process. Voucher programs work with Haitian homeowners, providing them money and guidance but letting them pick out designs, contractors, and buy materials. Unsurprisingly, models that work with Haitians from a place of mutual respect and that give Haitians agency to be a part of the solutions needed to rebuild their country have been much more successful.