Summary
Callicles observes that Socrates has turned life upside down. Callicles says that, according to Socrates, people should accuse themselves and their friends and family, to improve their moral characters. Socrates begins his long response by changing the subject slightly. He observes that communication between people is possible because their private experiences overlap. As an example, Socrates notes that he loves both Alcibiades and philosophy, while Callicles loves both Demus and the Athenian populace.
Socrates continues by saying that, although Callicles will alter his public views to please his private love, Socrates’ love of philosophy keeps him from changing his opinions to please Alcibiades. The views of philosophy are eternal and true, and so they never change. Over the course of their dialogue, Socrates and his interlocutors have arrived at the conclusion that there is nothing worse than unpunished wrongdoing. Callicles must either accept the conclusions that Socrates has drawn—that the rhetor should defend enemies and submit friends for punishment—or properly refute it.
Callicles praises Socrates for his “popular” (passionate) oratory style. He returns to a point of debate between Socrates and Gorgias, whether a rhetorician could teach morality. Callicles explains that Polus and Gorgias fell into error because they were too embarrassed to admit that they could not teach morality. Callicles believes there is nothing embarrassing here; it's not the job of rhetoric to teach morality. He says that Polus was similarly embarrassed to express his conviction that doing wrong is not more contemptible than suffering wrong.
Callicles goes on to say that Socrates doesn't reveal the truth, he just uses conventional definitions and the fear of embarrassment to trap his interlocutors in contradictions. The contradictions arise because Socrates confuses nature and convention. From the conventional standpoint (that is with regard to others), it is more contemptible to do wrong, but from the standpoint of nature (with regard to self), it is worse to suffer and therefore also more contemptible.
Further, being wronged is a problem for slaves only, because “real men” would defend themselves and their friends against unjust treatment, rather than cower and bend the rules to protect their own weakness. The law of nature privileges the strong and justifies their superior position. Convention, on the other hand, demands equality and fair distribution. Callilcles rejects the "charms and spells" of convention as “unnatural laws” that unnaturally limit “freedom.” Using the example of Hercules, he argues that, according to the law of nature, the property of the weaker man belongs to the stronger.
Callicles insists that philosophy and rhetoric are simply two distinct areas of expertise. Rhetoric is an understanding this human nature, which is not perfect but only “what people enjoy and desire" (484d). Unlike the philosopher who only knows his sphere of hypotheticals, the rhetor understands the legal system as well as human nature and may use this knowledge to bring the two into alignment. This is to exercise decorum, or to act in a manner that is appropriate to a situation.
According to Callilcles, philosophy is only useful for the young, but a hazard in older age. He demonstrates the idea of appropriateness by age: hesitating when you talk is good for a young person, because it shows an open mind, but for an older person, it means a lack of confidence. Callicles says that without confidence, a man like Socrates could not defend himself and might wind up dead.
Socrates is pleased to have Callicles as an interlocutor because Callicles is knowledgeable, and thinks enough of Socrates to speak frankly with him. In response to his argument, Socrates asks if "better," "stronger" and "superior" the same? Callicles says yes. Masses are superior to the single person, because they are stronger. They use that strength to pass laws dictating equitable distribution of property. So masses use strength (nature) to pass a law that Callicles regards as 'conventional'—that is, done to please others. Socrates has forced Callicles into a contradiction. Callicles now admits that what he means by "superior" is "elite," which is different than simple brute strength.
What makes the elite better? Cleverness? Callicles agrees to cleverness and the implication that one clever person is superior to the mass of people. By this logic, it is right for the clever person to possess more than the mass, despite their strength. Socrates considers the example of a mass of people. Who should they trust to feed them? A doctor knows most—is cleverest—about food and drink. But here someone who knows how to share and divide equally is needed. The mass, with their strength, will only trust someone who knows how to share to feed them. In this situation, a clever person would share, rather than hoard food for himself, because otherwise the mass will destroy him.
Callicles counters that this is a foolish application of the idea of cleverness. By that reasoning, a clever shoe-maker would make shoes for everyone, which is absurd. Cleverness means different things for different professions. He narrows his definition of "elite" to those who apply their cleverness to politics, and who are brave. These men, Callicles argues, should be rulers, and by "rights," rulers should have more right to power.
Analysis
We see from Socrates' insistence that Callicles accept the conclusions or prove him wrong that Socrates does not believe that a man can live in a state of ignorance. He calls this "internal discord." Socrates has allegorized this problem by referring to the two loves of each man: one is private, an intimate relationship, and the other is a shared concept: the Athenian people and philosophy.
The name "Demos" is both the proper name of Callicles' lover—Demos, the son of Pyrilampes—and the word for "the Athenian populous." (The latter is the root for the word "democracy.") By using this pun—where the same word refers to both Callicles' lover and the public for which he feels a more abstract affection—Socrates is able to show how difficult it can be to distinguish between what is private and what is public. He explains that Callicles panders to both his public love (the people), and his private love (the man Demos)—serving neither of them well. This illustrates a state of internal discord. Callicles cannot do what he thinks is good, but instead constantly tries to mold himself to his circumstance.
While Callilcles thinks that this kind of adapation to circumstance is just what you have to do to speak with others, Socrates maintains that this kind of speech is mere echo. Socrates says: “You’re so incapable of challenging your loved ones’ decisions and assertions that if anyone were to express surprise at the extraordinary things they cause you to say once in a while, you’d probably respond—if you were in a truthful mind—by admitting that it’s only when someone stops them voicing these opinions that you’ll stop echoing them” (481e-482a).
This molding to circumstance, what Socrates calls an echo, is precisely what Callicles means by "decorum," which was the primary principle of rhetoric. Of course, the students and teachers of decorous speech would not see it as a mere echo. Rhetors, and the medieval courtiers after them, believed that one must put honey on the rim of the cup with the bitter medicine. In other words, "a spoon full of sugar helps the medicine go down."
The principle of decorum is part of a long tradition that seeks to communicate truth to power and exists in any civilization where power is concentrated in one area—whether this is one man, a dictator, or, as in Athens, a democratic assembly that excludes slaves. To communicate the interests of the people or things that are not represented requires appealing to something beyond the personal interests of those in power. The rhetorical strategy would be to please them by appealing to their interests while directing them to a different purpose. Socrates calls this flattery, and says his philosophy will not do it.
While Callicles maintains that nature and convention are distinct, Socrates will try to prove that they must be reconciled. This would mean that Callicles' critique (that Socrates changes the perspective in order to trick his opponent) is invalid in Socrates' concept of truth, because for something to be true, the two perspectives would have to come together. When Socrates is able to demonstrate their nonalignment, it means he has really found an untruth.
Socrates' ultimate dismissal of Callicles—and presumably the entire rhetorical tradition—is that it is "stuck at the level of mere words” (489e). Meanwhile, Callicles continues defending the legitimacy of power, knowing that his job as a rhetor is not to dispute what exists but to bend it with words to whatever might be good enough at a given moment, even if it is not "the Good," in Socrates' sense.
