Barenaked Wading
In the introduction, Berkeley issues a warning about the inherent nature of language as a tool for obfuscation and confusion. This recognition leads him to certify to the reader that being aware of this swampy pitfall, he promises not to wade too deeply into the danger:
“Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use hath so strictly united with them”
Out of the Weeds
Still on the subject of not allowing the details of to distract from the larger purpose, Berkeley engages metaphor to indict the potential for extraneous semantic arguments to undermine the central issue of a scientific argument. He promises to cut through the undergrowth so his hypothesis can enjoy a full flowering:
“First, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely verbal—the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge.”
Cultivating Light
The metaphor of cultivating is also the central premise in his recognition that science has not been capable of explaining everything quite yet. In fact, far from it: knowledge of what is still lags far behind knowledge yet to come. He asks the reader to stick with him through the uncertainty of the abstractions he is about to unfold and remember the light that has science has thrown upon the unknown rather than being overwhelmed by the shadows.
“When men consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remains full of darkness and uncertainty…the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt of all study.”
Word Games
All this introductory warning and promising to the reader on the subject of the confusion wrought by scientific inquiry is not in vain. Though promising to be careful about using certain words that bring pre-attached perception of meaning to them, ultimately it is a subject which cannot be avoided because the premise of his entire theory demands a reconsideration of the fundamental nature of very basic language:
“But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so—the word idea not being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called things; and it is certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous.”
On the Nature of Will
Berkeley assigns guilt for the myriad examples of errors in morality to the wrongful attribution of metaphorical concepts to the notion of describing human will. His example of this type of metaphorical construction of the manner in which human work their will by nature of external forces is particularly striking:
“For example, the will is termed the motion of the soul; this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket.”
